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STATEMENT OF PROBLEM AND CONCERNS
"Ronald Reagan is the best thing that has ever
happened to liberal lobby groups for the purpose of
attracting members and raising funds. Reagan has
aroused liberals out of the apathy into which they
had
sunk
during
the
Ford
and
Carter
Administrations."
Leon Shull, National Director ADA
For conservatives, it was a moment to savor. For liberals, a time
for plaintive rumination. The election of 1980 marked one of the most
dramatic upheavals in modern American political history - a massive
voter uprising that severed inveterate party lines and shattered the
New

Deal

coalition

Administration.
concomitant

forged

The breadth

influx

of

Franklin

during

of

Ronald

congressional

Roosevelt's

Reagan's victory and
conservatives

the

ostensibly

portended a sweeping deprecation of the liberal principles which
shaped the nation's legislative agenda for nearly three decades.
Moreover, the outcome hinted at the inception of GOP domination that
could endure for years to come.

political analysts subsequently ascribed this turnabout to an
ephemeral shift of traditional voting blocs, identifying the pivotal
factor

as

economic

national discontent
policies,

rather

with

than

the Carter Administration's

enthusiasm

for

the

conservative

ideology espoused by Ronald Reagan.ll Nevertheless, this assessment
offered

liberals

little

solace,

as

the

results

were

commonly

perceived as an accurate reflection of a prevailing conservative
trend. Ronald Reagan himself fostered this misconception. In a post
election address the President-elect stated:
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"our victory was not so much a victory of politics as
it was a v ictory of ideas, not so much a v ictory for
anyone man or par ty as it was a v ictory for a set 0 f
principles."~/

However one chooses to

interpret the election outcome,

the

results remain clear: Ronald Reagan garnered 489 of the nation's 538
electoral votes and a 51 percent popular majority, leaving Jimmy
Carter the distinction

o~

being the first Democratic President in 92

years to be denied re-election; the Repub1 icans wrestled control of
the Senate from the Democrats, unseating such prominent incumbents as
Frank Church, George McGovern, Birch Bayh, and

~

Culver;

the

Democratic majority in the House eroded as 33 freshmen Republicans
rode to victory on Reagan I s coattails; and the GOP scored major gains
in gubernatorial and state legislative races across the country.l/

Unbeknownst to Democrats in 1980, the seeds for this defeat were
planted in 1974, in the wake of the Watergate scandal. Besmirched by
Richard Nixon's humiliating resignation and the loss of 95 House seats
to

Democratic

embarrassment.

challengers,

the

GOP sought

to

avenge

this

twin

In the short-run, the Republican party set out to

salvage its waning credibility. While its long-term objective was to
undermine the Democratic stronghold of the legislative process.!/

This opportunity presented itself in the same year when the
Federal

Election

contributions.

Commission

i~posed

The purpose of course,

a

ceiling

on

political

was to preclude the power

brokers from determining the course of future elections. But there was
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a loophole in the new federal election laws that permitted political
action committees to legally and independently spend $5,000 in the
primary and another $5,000 in the general

election.~/

An

unforsee~

loophole that conservatives capitalized on immediately.

Under the tutelage of such conservative ideologues as

Ter~'~

Dolan and Richard Viguerie, the New Right harnessed the support of

I,

religous fundamentalists and a host of other right-wing groups and
formed a ba t tal ion of PAC

all consigned wi th the task of toppl ing

liberal incumbents. For the next six years, the New Right galvanized
its

suppor t,

amassed

strategies

and

atrophied,

resisting

vast

techniques.
the

sums

of

money,

Concurrently,
changes

and

and

amel iora ted

liberal

innovations

its

organizations
which

their

adversar ies were perfecting. Lulled into complacency bred by decades
of prosper i ty,

these 1 i bera 1 organ i za t ions were i ll-equ ipped

thwart the impending Reagan/New Right

to

onslaught.~/

In 1980, the New Right declared open season on liberals and its
PAC's were loaded for bear. Consequently,

in a well-orchestrated

barrage of negative and caustic media campaigns, the Democrats lost
both the Whi te House and con trol of .t he Senate. Simply pu t,
Democrats

suffered

a

colossal

defeat

at

the

hands

of

a

the

better

organized, better managed, and better funded opposition.l/

What effect did this deviating election have on ideological
liberal organizations? The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the
palpable

impact

of

the

Reagan/New

Right

landslide

has

been

an
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unparalleled resurgence of progressive activism at the grass roots
and national levels. Their overconfidence tempered by defeat and on
the defensive for the first time in recent history, liberals emerged
from 1980 more united than ever before. Fearing that the New Right
legislative agenda would undercut progressive strides which took
.t.

decades to ach»Ve,
communi ty

traditionally diverse factions of the liberal

coalesced

aga ins t

a

common

foe.

Inspi red

by

NCPAC 's

-

success, liberal organizations adopted some of the innovations they
formerly eschewed and mastered a few of their own. By all accounts 
Ronald Reagan,

Terry Dolan,

Richard Viguerie,

and Jerry Falwell

provided the needed stimulus for a broad-scale liberal renaissance.

The

fact

that

the

rejuvenation

of

ideological

liberal

organizations coincides wi th the Reagan/New Right victory of 1980 is

------

theoretically substantiated by the noted political scientist, James

Q. Wilson. In his book, Political organizations, Wilson argues:
"The existence of active organizing cadres and the
spread of doctrines that give legitimacy to their
efforts are not sufficient to explain organizational
formation. In addition, there must be a belief among
members of an association that matters of concern to
them are being affected by other institutions in the
society whose behav ior can be al tered. That bel ief is
more likely to emerge when a highly visible person or
organization appears to be posing a serious threat to
some values of importance to the members. II .!!./
A

theoretical

basis

also

underlies

the

forementioned

coalescence of the liberal movement. According to Wilson:
"Whenever political issues are raised in social
structures, there is a desire on the part of most
persons to make their affiliations and loyalties

jftJ¥-
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consistent, and thus eliminate the strain and
tension
that
came
from
being
involved
in
inconsistent social relationships. The more salient
the issue, the greater the desire for affiliational
consistency. "2/
James wi 150n 's theoret ical premi ses and Leon Shull' 5 empi r ical
assessment
renaissance

are
of

remarkably

congruous.

ideological

liberal

Each

explains

organizations

that

the

directly

corresponds with circumstances favorable for their resurgence: the

1980 Reagan/New Right landslide.
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REVIEW OF RELEVANT PROFESSIONAL LITERATURE

OVERVIEW OF IDEOLOGICAL ORGANIZATIONS

I.

Structure and Composition

A) Membership

The distinguishing feature of ideological organizations are
their predominant reliance on "purposive incentives" to bind their
} member s toge ther. De fined her e as "bene fits

0

f some 1a rger pub I ic or

J
I

society as a whole and not for members, except insofar as members
derive a s e n s eo f fulfilled commitment or enhanced personal worth from
the effort", these purposive incentives have proved to be the catalyst
for mobilizing the diverse constituencies of ideological groups.IO/
"

As such, "purpos i ve organ i z a t ions" tend to at trac t per sons who
strongly identify with a cause and are prepared to make a lasting
commitment to a particular organization.!!/

By their nature,

ideological organizations are not cohesive

entities. In sharp contrast to single issue politics which involves
intense concentration on a particular policy area, ideological groups
maintain a

far

more comprehensive

political

certain moral or philosophical precepts,

outlook.

Guided

by

these groups articulate

pos i t ions cons isten t wi th thei r ideology on a broad range of issues.
Because of this, ideological organizations assume a rather monolithic
posture and are uncompromising about their objectives.12/
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Due

to

the

comprehensive

and

inflexible

nature

of

these

organizations, the possibilities for intra-organizational conflict
increase markedly. Purposive incentives can be amorphous and may vary
somewhat according to the priorities of each individual member. Thus,
fissures

within

a

group may

occur

either

explicates a position that a member(s)

when

an

organization

is opposed to, or when the

organization and the individual disagree on which issue merits the
group's

immediate attention. This likelihood is compounded by the

fact that group leaders possess considerable discretion in pursuing
the purposive objectives of their organizations.!1/

The

inescapable

conclusion

derived

from

these

theoretic

premises is tha t ideolog ical groups cannot always function in a manner
that

promotes

organizational

cohesion;

that

divisiveness

among

members or between leaders and members is inevitable somewhere along
the way. while this probably holds true generally, it does not apply
when these groups are faced with adversity. As Wilson points at:
"Threats, if they arise from outside the group, tend
to
increase cohesiveness and integration and
heighten the attraction that group members feel
toward one another.
Various experiments have
concluded that harsh or badgering treatment of a
group by an outsider decreases hostility within a
group and increases cooperativeness. The advantages
to
the
organization,
or
the
organization's
representative, of being able to mobilize around a
distinct threat or symbolically important moral
issue are likely to be greatest, of course, when the
members of an organization perceive the threat or
issue in similar ways, and this similar point of view
is most likely to occur when the members of an
organization are more or less alike in material
interest or personal ideology.II!!/
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Another factor that oftentimes inhibits organizational cohesion
is overlapping membership. Many political activists establish a web
of ties to var ious groups, and these relationships, on occassion, may
come into confl i c t wi th one another and resul t in "c r o s s p r e s s u r e i nq "
of an individual. Empirical data reveals that multiple affiliations
tend

to

produce

organizational

heterogeneous

membership,

thereby

reducing

cohesion.~/

Yet in periods of adversity in which disparate groups share a
perceived threat to their interests, be they material or purposive,
the reverse effect of crosspressured membership surfaces -- a pattern
in which overlapping memberships reinforce each other. The result is
likely

to

be a

grea t e.r- commi tment

to a

cause and

thus,

homogeneous

m~.~/ Ample

contention.

Following the Reagan/New Right landslide of

a

more

evidence exists to buttress this
1980,

a

number of liberal organizations experienced surges in membership
totals: The National Organization For Women gained 12,000 new members
in November, 1980 alone-near ly a ten percent increase (no doubt due to
Reagan's obdurate refusal to endorse ERA ratification); the NAACP
recorded 17,2000 new members in six weeks in the Fall of 1980;.!:2/ the
American Civil Liberties Union headquarters reported that they were
receiving 500 letters containing contributions daily, many of those
joining being former members;

~/

Americans Por Democratic Action's

membership burgeoned by 10,000 in one

B)

year.~/

Fund Raising: Cultivating the Grass Roots
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Of the three most important elements of organizational strengthmembership, money, and leadership, ideological liberal groups have
traditionally

only

been

rich

in

leadership~~/

Because

these

organizations accrue purposive rather than material rewards, they
generally

lead

a

hand-to-mouth

existence.

Futhermore,

while

ideological liberal groups obviously strive to advance the cause of a
much larger constituency, it is their conservative counterparts who
usually

identify

with

the

more

affluent

populace.

Survey

data

indicates that group membership is positively associated with "higher
income,

higher

education,

and

higher

levels

of

living."~.!/

Consequently, liberal organizations cannot rely on those who may
benefit most from their efforts to maintain organizational solvency.

since ideOlOgy~l liberal groups "arise out of the ranks of the
powerless", i t
raising to

i~mperative

su~ain

that they place a heavy emphasis on fund

membership contributions."22/

In

theory,

the

outcome of the 1980 elections should have facilitated the fund raising
prospects of liberal organizations. Wilson asserts that:
"Groups faced with a dramatic threat to clear
interests
or
seeking
a
single
objective
of
overriding moral significance are often able to
raise large sums of money or produce the equivalent
commitment in time and effort.".~l/
Galvanizing membership support and amassing vast sums of money
proved to be the key to the New Right's success in 1980. In large part,
this was accomplished through sophisticated direct-mail campaigns.
Upon establishing a network of computer-based operations with the
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capacity to send messages and process the responses, the New Right
flooded the nation with emotionally-laden appeals which more often
than not included spurious allegations and indictments of liberal
incumbents.

Nonetheless,

cogent,

they

for

principal

these

inspired

architect

of

a

this

appeal s

must

have been

somewhat

wave of conservative activism.

The

technique

the

is Richard Viguerie,

acclaimed "godfather of the New Right". According to him:
"Wha t a good direct-rna i 1 opera t ion can do is
concentrate an appeal to a responsive audience and
maintain the active membership communication needed
to
sustain
any
organization's
morale
and
contribution base."~/
Theoretically, the palpable resul t of a widespread campaign such
as the one la.unched by the New Right is the "stimulation of opposing
groups." Moreover, "if the goals of an organi zation are to prevent the
establishment of programs judged detrimental to its organizational
interests, the technique is to identify the proponents of the programs
with 'ev\il' symbols."2S/ These premises, when considered in aggregate
wi th wi d s o n ' s foremen tioned quote (footnote 23) l.e ad one to expect to
see liberal organizations not only incorporate techniques analogous
to those employed by the New Right, but also to experience similiar
fund raising success.

Empirically, this is exactly what happened. The resurgence in
ACLU member sh ip con tr ibu t ions d i rec tly correIa tes to its most recen t
fund r a i si ng campaign. The ACLU took out a ser ies of full page ads in
the New York Times which headlined, "rf the Moral Majority has its way,
you'd

better

start

praying",

and

concluded

by

asking

for

12

con tr ibu tions to "assure that the Bi 11
the

generation.II~_§/

next

Likewise,

0

f Rights wi 11 be passed on to

ADA

attributes

its boost

in

membership contributions to anti-Reagan mailings.

Educational Role

C)

Precisely

because

ideological

liberal

organizations

seek

purposive rather than material rewards from their efforts, they tend
to

regard

"educational ll

activities

responsibilities.""!:J.../ Thus,
organization

and

those

among

their

principal

in drawing a distinction between his

which

"speak

for

private

or

commercial

interests", an ADA official explained "our competi tion is in realm of
ideas."28/

",'"

\

Along with
ideological

their

lib~~

organ i z a t ions formulate

\

II

role as
groups

"political action" organizations,

also

operate

as

"political

idea"

intellectual and propaganda groups str i v ing

comprehensive

liberal

positions

on

national

to

public

policy." The tactical activities in which these organizations engage
in pursuing this strategy includes the formulation and dissemination
of liberal programs and

In

their

policies.~/

formulation

efforts,

these

groups

try

to

act

as

stimulators and coordinators of liberal thinking by convening forums
or conferences. The purposes of which are to "provide a pulpit for
experts chosen for their newsworthiness as well as for their expertise
- whose views and conclusions on questions are likely to attract
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a ttent ion and command respect." These groups occas ionally subs id i ze
research and publications, intended for general distribution, which
in effect serve as liberal policy papers."l.QI

The chief means for policy dissemination are publications and
newsletters.

Ideological

groups

possess

the

unique

power

to

facilitate the dissemination of ideas and thereby mobilize support
for their positions through their publications. Consequently, these
groups have proved to be particularly adept at putting forth valuable
issue-oriented information. Futhermore, because issue saliency is a
key variable in attracting - members,
serve

to

reinforce organizational

newsletters and publications
bonds

and maintain

an

active

membership. 31-1

Assuming that Wilson I s theoretical precepts not only encompass
organizational

membership

and

fund

raising,

but

extend

to

the

educational role of ideological organizations as well, one would
expect that liberal groups have stepped up their policy formulation
and dissemination efforts significantly since 1980.

II.

Exerting political Pressure: Lobbying Techniques

1)

Traditional Lobbying - The Direct and Personal Approach

A) Reinforcing Friendly Ties

In theory, the same circumstances which enhance the recruiting
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and

fund

raising

activities

of

ideological

organizations

also

facilitate their lobbying efforts. According to Wilson, being on the
defensive and trying to sustain existing programs provides these
groups with

"organizational

maintainence-advantages"

they would

otherwise not derive when striving to change government policies or
promote new ones.
"For one thing, threats to existing material or
nonmaterial interests are easier to understand and
less
productive
of
disagreement
than
are
opportunities to improve or extend those interests.
Rights or income now enjoyed provide a lowest common
denomina tor of interest and agreement; proposals for
enlarging those rights or increasing that income are
likely to be discounted. If the gains are in the
future, if indeed they will be realized at all, there
will be an unwillingness to bear present costs of
programs that have no guarantee of success. All
things
being
equal,
political
activity
is
facilitated by the same conditions that make
organizational formation easier-namely, perceived
threats to existing values."~1
Buttressing Wilson1s contention,

v.o.

Key states:

"If the purpose is to defeat a bill, lobbyists skill
and attention may be even more effective. The
procedures of legislatures gives advantages to those
who seek to prevent action. At many stages, from
committee consideration to executive approval, a
bill can be killed, and an alert legislative counsel
may perhaps carry the day at one step if not another.
~I

Traditionally,

ideological organizations have focused

their

lobbying efforts on stregthening ties with political decision makers
who already share their views and .policy objectives. Consequently,
their

legislative

primary

representatives

responsibility

of

have

"arousing

been
the

consigned
latent

with

concerns

the
of

congressional and administrative syrnpathizers,"lil and to "persuade
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members to work even harder on behalf of the group's interests.

"~/

As

William Keefe asserts:
"Lobbyists know that few votes are ever changed as a
result of their efforts, and accordingly they
concentrate their resources on 'backstopping' or
reinforcing those members who are known to be
favorable to their position."~/
Based on his study of the Americans for Democratic Action's
lobbying techniques, Clifton Brock reached the same conclusion.
"ADA seldom can and seldom does I apply pressure' or
'put the heat' on congressmen. Its lobbying is a low
pressure operation, designed more to convince
friends than to coerce or convert enemies."l!/
Again, Wilson's theoretical analysis serves to substantiate the
above empirical assessments:
"Whatever the timing or nature of the intervention,
the experienced organizational representative will
see his task as one of evolving, maintaining, and
enhancing existing relationships with sympathetic
or like-minded public officials. He, like the
precinct captain of a political party, will devote
most of his contact time to stimulating activity by,
and providing information to, persons who he has
reason to believe are in general agreement with him.
Time, energy, and money are in short supply;
diverting much of any of these resources to persons
known, or suspected to be, opposed to you is less
efficient than devoting them to persons who, once
aroused and informed, will act on your behalf. And in
any event, representatives are human: arguing with
persons wi th whom one disagrees is an unpleasantness
one would just as soon avoid. As a result of these
factors, a representat i ve tends to become a serv ice
bureau for those congressmen (and other officials)
already agreeing with him, rather than an agent of
direct persuasion for those who do not."38/
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Accept i ng

tha t

the

lobby i ng

capac i ty

ideo log i ca 1

of

organizations is enhanced by being on the defensive and that they in
turn concentrate on reinforcing existing ties with like-minded public
officials, the log ical corollary is that liberal congressmen, spurred
by relen tess lobby i ng ef for ts, would pose an ef feet i ve oppos i t ion to
New Right legislative initiatives. Recent developments in the 98th
Congress lend credence to this assumption.
domestic issues,
setbacks

as

a

In foreign as well as

the New Right sustained a series of legislative

number

of

President

Reagan's

most

prized

policy

initiatives encountered stiff resistance from united Democrats. To
cite just a few examples: The President was forced to acquiesce to a
compromise budget plan that transferred billions of dollars to social
programs that. were or ig inally earmarked for defense expend i tures; in
the face of strong opposition from the Administration, the Democrats
pushed a nuclear-freeze resolution through the House; and the House
Select Committee on Intelligence voted along party lines to end covert
U.S. support for Nicaraguan

B}

rebels.~/

Lobbying Alliances and Ad-Hoc Coalitions

Wh i Le
concentrated

ideolog ical
their

organ i zat ions

lobbying

efforts

on

have

trad it ionally

reinforcing

ties

with

political officials who identify with their cause, political analysts
have found that "lobbying strength reaches its peak when a number of
organizations combine forces. A successful coalition, with its impact
on public opinion, can force even the President to take it into
account. "!Q./

"Of all

the

techniques

for

opening

communications

17

channels

between

lobbyists

and

legislators,

collaborating with other groups is most valued.

II

! !/

tactic

the

of

Consequently, a

"cooperative lobbying technique" has become increasingly popular
among public interest groups.ill

These legislative combinations " a rise because groups share a
common

ideology and

Furthermore,

a

compatible

set

of

pol icy

objectives. "QI

they tend to be ephemeral in nature because of what

Wilson calls lithe imperatives of organizational maintenance -- the

"

need to maintain a distinctive organizational identitY.!!1

There are two sign i f i c an t advan tages to forming ad-hoc all i ances
between public, interest groups. First, "they allow for an efficient
division of lobbying r e s o u r oe s

s "

Second, " c o alitions can spread the

risks and costs among the members. By sharing costs, a given group can
participate in more campaigns or more powerfully in fewer e f f o r t s
Essentially,

the

formation

of

informal

alliances

enhances

c

"

the

lobby ing capac i ty of publ ic in teres t groups because it enabl es them to
IIjoin together to defeat or promote an issue without establishing a
new organization to coordinate the lobbying

effort."~1

Yet in past years, ideological liberal organizations have proved
unable

to

interest

build

unified

lobbying

groups.

This

undoubtedly

ideological

organizations

are

coalitions
stems
composed

with

from
of

other

the

fact

public
that

heterogeneous

consti tuencies and work on a wide spectrum of reform causes; " a nd the
other groups have more cohesive constituencies and must determine
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their priorities accordingly."!§./

According to Wilson:
liThe normal tendency of formal organizations to
resist coalition formation can be overcome if the
existing level of resources and autonomy for all
prospective members can be significantly threatened
(a crisis). In the first case, organizations may
coalesce in order to survive or to end a war of
attrition that has become too costly; in the latter,
they may coal-esce because a si tuation has been
created in which all can benefit, thereby changing a
condition of partial conflict to one of pure
coordination. A crisis may lead to the formation of a
coalition because existing money resources are
suddenly jeopardized or because a dramatic event
leads to a general demand that organizations act
together for the common good."il/
Wilson further contends that:

"on important or divisive issues, an organizational
representative can enhance his group's legitimacy if
he can describe it as broadly representative of all
relevant affected interests. This, in turn often
requires him to enter into coalitions with other
organizations. An organizational representative
knows tha t pol icy-makers see a broad coal i t ion as an
indication that a majority of the affected parties
are behind a policy, that there is accordingly only
one 'right' course of action, and above all that his
organization's interest in it is not narrowly self
serv i ng. ".!!!/
If Wilson's theories are indeed valid, one would expect that,
since 1980, ideological liberal organizations have overcome their
problem of

engag ing

favorable for

in

lobbying coal i t ions.

The cond i tions are

these groups to form such ad-hoc all iances:

issue

sal iency is cer ta inly a t a high po i nt, and the threa ts posed by the New
Right are not endemic to any pa r t icular organ i za t ion, bu t threa ten the

19

interests of all groups which purport to advance any type of liberal
cause.

The

following

example

illustrates the validity of Wilson's

theoretical premises. To combat Reagan's proposed budget cuts in

1981, Americans for Democratic Action mobilized 150 assorted labor
and liberal organizations.

Among the most prominent groups

that

joined the coalition were the AFL-CIO, UAW, the National Council of
Churches,

and

the

League

of Women voters •.!~/

In

add i tion,

ADA

dispatched its officers to 18 cities to address local budget meetings
and encourage the creation of other budget

2.

alliances.~1

Newer Modes of Lobbying: Indirect & Electronic Techniques

A)

Rise of Grass Roots Lobbying

Tapping grass roots support is not an entirely new phenomenon in
American politics.

For years,

it has been recognized by elected

officials as a powerful source of political influence, and has been
embraced by ideo log ical organ i za t ions as a nexus between the na t i onal
offices and their heterogenous constituencies. Yet in recent years,
cultivating grass roots ties has emerged as a major lobbying tactic
among public interest groups. Two principal factors account for this
significant transformation of contemporary lobbying: the erosion of
political parties as an efficient means for linking citizens with
political decisions makers; and the advent of sophisticated computerbased

technologies

and

expanded

communications

capacities.ill
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According to Ronald Hrebenar:
lIA technological revolution has enveloped lobbying.
The use of computers, data processing, direct mail
solicitation, and increased use of media has
modernized the lobby game."gl
Not

surprising,

ideological

organizations

have

begun

to

place

increasing emphasis on grass roots lobbying techniques to supplement
the more traditional forms of direct lobbying.

The essence of indirect lobbying "is the stimulation of an
orchestrated groundswell which will appear to be spontaneous and
unorganized. Natural is the key concept in a good grass roots lobbying
campaign.lI~l/

Ornstein

and

organizations

Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Policy-making.

In
Elder

distinguish

facilitate

the

the

ways

in

transmission

which
of

ideological

messages

from

constituents to political decision makers: the direct approach, which
involves

"explicit

assistance

or

direction

to group members or

sympathizers to contact representatives or senators about an issue or
bill;

II

and the indirect approach, in which groups "promote a general

viewpoint on a broad public policy issue by using popular outlets for
lobbying appeals-ads in newspapers and magazines, commercials on
television and radio."2.!1

The former is most commonly manifest in grass roots letterwriting campaigns. If properly manaqed , this type of campaign will
make

the

deluge

of

letters,

phone

calls,

and

telegrams

appear

spontaneous and genuine. And if it appears to be genuine rather than an
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orchestrated effort of a public interest group, it will prove to be
remarkably influential. A recent study found that congressional staff
members overwhelmingly ranked "spontaneous letters and phone calls
from constituents" as
"Orchestrated mail
relatively

the most effective type of communication.

from constituents" was considered to be only

irnportant.~/

Representative Thomas Railback

(R-Ill.)

shares this assessment.
"The most effective lobby campaigns involve the
local constituencies -- if you get a letter from a
constituent, you pay attention. He is not an
outsider. He is somebody who votes for or against
yoU.II~/

Initially, the success of the New Right's grass roots efforts
were

attributed

to

direct-mail

fund

raising

for

conservative

candidates. But this only reflects one dimension of the New Right's
effectiveness at the grass roots level. To stress only fund raising in
Richard Viguer ie I swords, "is to miss the po in t of d irect-mai 1. II He
writes:
"Some people persist in thinking of direct-mail as
only
fund
raising,
but
its
really
mostly
advertising. Raising money is only one of the several
purposes of direct mail advertising letters. A
letter may ask you to vote for a candidate, volunteer
for campaign work, circulate a petition among your
neighbors, write letters to your Senator and
Congressmen,
urging
them
to
pass
or
defeat
legislation and also ask you for money to pay for the
direct-mail advertising campaigns.u~J./
Much

of

the

New Right's d i r ec ti-ona i I

activity continues

to

emphasize contributions because of the relatively high cost of the
technique. Yet, its capacity to stir up conservative passions and to
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mobil i ze a t tent i ve groups by carefully targeti ng its appeal s cannot
be overlooked. Direct-mail, by identifying a certain set of potential
activists, provides a base for broader communications. According to
viguerie:
"Without direct-mail, we might have no National
Review, no Human Events, no Conservative Digest, no
conservative PAC's, no effective organizations in
Right to Work, Right to Life, pro-gun, anti-busing,
national defepse, pro-family, no large national
conservative organizations and youth training. You
can think of direct-mail as our TV, radio, daily
newspaper, and weekly magazine.II~/
While viguerie may well be overestimating the impact of his
direct-mail campaign,

the

fact remains

that

ideological

liberal

organizations, by creating their own communications networks, can
genera te a tremendous grass roots response wi thou t any r e I iance upon
expensive conventional media outlets. Facing the reality that their
const i tuency is much larger and more broad based than the New Righ tis
and accepting that grass roots lobbying has become more influential
than the traditional personal approach, the conditions are ripe for
liberal groups to undertake just such an endeavor.

The second facet of grass roots lobbying Ornstein and Elder refer
to is the indirect technique in which interest groups "seek to

mold

favorable public attitudes toward their organizations and goals." As
William Keefe points out:
IIpublic relations is now recognized as a central,
sometimes predominant, means by which groups seek to
obtain their goals; indeed no major organization
would feel at all secure without a broadly based
program for
influencing public opinion. Major
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organizations have found it advisable to organize
both
shortand
long-range
public
relations
programs, the former focused to gain immediate
public support in skirmishes with other groups and
government, the latter aimed at molding a climate of
friendly opinion to the organization and its aims. At
bottom, the purpose of each is to 'make the program of
the group appear synonimous with the general
welfare.' Groups have come to recognize that, over
the long haul, success is likely to depend on their
having accumulated a reservoir of public goodwill,
which in turn will have been shaped partially by
widespread
acceptance
of
their
ideological
positions. Merchandising an ideology or educating
the public, whatever the process may be termed, is
the continuing function of interest group public
relations."~/

Furthermore,

Ronald

Hrebenar

contends

that

the

success

of

interest group's public relations activity is noticeably enhanced
when these organizations are on the defensive and are "trying to
prevent a change in the existing order":
"Lobbies that practice defensive propaganda are
usually well established organizations. Success at
negative lobbying is usually easier to obtain
because it is a lot easier to stop something in
governmen t than to get something new approved.
Within the mazes of Congress and the executive branch
there are a hundred places to ambush a piece of
legislation. One of the tactics used by established
lobbies is to carry their fight to the American
public for two basic reasons. First, they feel a real
need to convince the public of the legitimacy of
their position.
Second,
they react to
their
opponent's media campaigns and seek to reduce the
impact of their opponent's argurnents.'I.§...Q/
As

mentioned

earlier,

ideological

organizations

are

particularly adept at "carrying their fight to the American public"
because they consider educational activity among their paramount
responsibi 1 it i e s , Edward Hollander, a former ADA off icial, de s c r ibed
his organization'

5

emphasis on policy formulation and dissemination
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"as

an

effort

marketplace:

to

get

ideas

and

issues

up

into

the

political

1I

IIWhat we really try to do is raise and publicize
problems and issues which others might like to
ignore. Then we yell as loud as we can to keep the
politicians from sweeping these problems under the
rug.
Sometimes we can convince some liberal
politicians that our position on these issues -- say
civil rights for instance -- is not only morally
right but also good politics. Once the issue is up
into the po Li t Lc a L consciousness of the public we try
to keep it moving, but about all we can do is hope that
the normal democratic processes will take it to a
successful end. Our unique function, I suppose, is to
raise
issues
in
as
many
public
places
as
possible. ".§.!/
Because grass roots lobbying is widely recognized by political
officials as

the most efficacious means

for

an

organization

to

translate its objectives into public policy, it is clear that the
recent shift toward tapping grass roots support by public interest
groups will indeed continue. Furthermore, it is equally apparent that
ideological liberal organizations stand to benefit most from this
trend: they have access to a far broader-based and thereby potentially
more

powerful

activity

constituency:

combined

with

initiatives, makes

them

the

and

their

impact

emphasis

of

ideally suited

New

on

educational

Right

legislative

to mold

favorable public

attitudes toward their cause.

B)

The Proliferation of Political Action Committees

The congressional elections of 1976 first drew attention to the
increasingly

prominent

role

of

political

action

committees

in
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campa ign pol i tics. Dur i ng that elect ion, a host of single issue PAC' s,
conservative in ideology, spent record sums of money to unseat liberal
and entrench conservative incumbents. In that one year alone, NCPAC
raised over $3 million, and "old-time liberal" Senators Frank Moss of
Utah and Gale McGee of Wyoming went down to surprising

defeat.~/

By 1978, the number of PAC's, again nearly all conservative,
tripled from 576 in 1974 to more than

l,82 ~. ~

helped defeat Senators Dick Clark of Iowa,

~n k

While the New Right
Haskell of Colorado,

and Thomas McIntyre of New Hampshire, they raised more than $5 million
to re-elect Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina and raised $4.5
m i 11 ion for Sena tor John Tower' s campa i qn , In addi tion, NCPAC played
an i n s t r ume n t a'L role in Edward King's gubernatorial upset victory in
Massachusetts.~/

Amidst heated congressional debate over

the proper

role of

PAC's, the onslaught of 1980 came. The New Right gave the term "hit
list"

a

political

connotation

as

liberal

incumbents were

first

targeted for defeat and then beseiged by a flurry of negative and
acr imonious media campaigns. Polls conducted after the fi.r:st phase of
NCPAC attacks generally showed that the -
"Media campaigns diluted support among Republican
voters
for
the
Democratic
incumbents.
More
importantly, the attacks weakened the loyalties of
Democratic voters and left them suseptible to
subsequent persuasion l;>y the campaigns of the
Republican challengers. u §.2/

Yet the NCPAC assaults served conservative candidates in other
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ways as well. By savagely attacking the credibility and integrity of
liberal incumbents, NCPAC "allowed Republican candidates the luxury
of taking the high road.
could

lie

through

its

II

In Terry Dolan I swords, "A group 1 ike ours
teeth

and

the

cand ida tes

it

helps

stay

clean. ".§..§./

Moreover, NCPAC attacks wreaked havoc on Democratic campaign
stra tegy. Writ ing for Camea igns and Elections magaz ine, Brad Bannon
asserts:
"Many of the Democrats facing re-election in 1980
sought to avoid the impact of issues such as national
defense, government spending, and abortion by basing
their campaigns on their personal qualifications and
their long years of public service to their state
during their tenure in the u.s. Senate. But ,t h e NCPAC
attacks changed the campaign agenda ~ prompting many
of the target candidates to abandon their original
campaign strategy and respond directly to attacks on
the i r vot i ng records. The cand ida tes pu t themsel ve s
on the defense, fighting the unconventional battle
with unfamiliar weapons. II §.2/

In the wake of the 1980 elections, liberals set out to stage a
counterattack. Liberal PAC's a rarity prior to the Reagan/New Right
landsl ide have since proliferated in number. In the first half of 19B1
alone,

three major PAC's were formed to combat the New Right.

In

February, Mo Udall and Paul Tsongas organi zed Independent Ac t ion, to
assist

"progressive

candidates"

financially.

In

March,

George

McGovern formed Americans for Common Sense, using mailing lists that
date back to his ill-fated Presidential campaign.

In May,

Pamela

Harriman announced the formation of Democrats for the BO's with a
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combination of familiar old names now out-of-office and a collection
of current

incumbents.~1

Armed with the technological innovations and expertise they
formerly resisted, these and other liberal PAC I

S

are now busy laying

the foundation for their own Washington purge in 1984. According to
Maxwell Glen, a writer for the National Journal:
"Their goal is threefold: to maintain a Democratic
majority in the House and assist embattled liberals
in the Republican controlled Senate; to neutralize
the effect of the New Right, including conservative
christian activists, in Washington and elsewhere;
and to promote liberal positions on such issues as
the environment, foreign policy, abortion, women's
rights, and social security.Il~1
While all liberal PAC·s share a complementary set of goals, their
strategies for achieving them vary. For instance, the Progressive
Political Action Committee and the National Progressive PAC have
adopted the "NCPAC independent attack strategy" -- waging negative
media campaigns through the mass media. The prime target for 1984 is
the quintessential conservative Senator from North Carolina, Jesse
Helms.J..Q1

But most liberal PAC's intend to avoid negative campaigns and
contribute their resources to beseiged liberal incumbents or friendly
challengers. For example, Americans for Democratic Action PAC has
already been operating for four years and contributed $48,250 to 36
liberal House and Senate candidates in 1980.

211
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By whatever means liberal PAC's intend to wage their war against
the New Right, they are well aware that in order to mount such a
campaign vast amounts of organizational

resources

are

required,

namely money. Although they harbor no illusion of matching the $5.4
million that NCPAC spent

in 1980,

liberal groups

hope

to

raise

millions of dollars by capitalizing on public fears about Reagan/New
Right legislative initiatives and programs. Consequently, with the
exceptions of Democrats for the 80
of

America,

major

liberal

I

S

and the Committee for the Future

PAC's

are

emphasizing

grass

roots

solicitation of small sums of money rather than relying on appeals to
large donors. On paper, this strategy seems viable. According to most
estimates, there are three to five million names in the "universe" of
liberal donors.21/

Because of their reliance on purposive incentives, ideological
organizations "usually try to get involved only when there's a clear
philisophical dispute.tlll..l And when such occassions arise, these
groups tend to target their campaign resources "where it will do the
most qood " -- contributing to candidates who share and will strive to
enact their policy objectives.2!/ Ronald Reagan's victory and the
influx of conservatives on Capitol Hill not only carried the seeds for
a

"philosophical

dispute,"

but

has

the makings

for

an

all-out

ideological donnybrook. Thus, one would expect to see liberal PAC
activity intensify dramatically since 1980 and leading up to the 1984
election.

The

overriding

goal

being

a

flood

of

grass

roots

contr ibutions to oust conservative congressmen and replace them wi th
liberal candidates.
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CONCLUSION

Throughout this section, I sought to establish a nexus between
interest group theory and empi r ical observa tions. Th is in turn, would
prov ide the fr amewor k from wh ich I

would se t

forth

a

ser i es of

hypotheses concerning the impact of the deviating 1980 elections on
ideological liberal organizations. What I found in fact, was not just
a link but a near perfect correlation between theory and practice,
each reinforcing the other and pointing to the same ineluctable
conclusion: The upshot of the Reagan/New Right landsl ide of 1980 was a
dramatic

renaissance

of

American

liberalism.

A

renaissance

so

pervasive that ideological liberal organizations stand to benefit
tremendously in terms of sustaining membership and raising funds.
Moreover, it promises to facili tate the formation of liberal lobbying
coalitions and enhance
support.

their

capacity

to

cultivate grass

roots
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II Per iods
of apparent adversi ty and danger to an
organization
are
golden
opportunities
for
membership growth and fund raising. II ] ..: i/

-HYPOTHESIS I-

Since

the

1980

elections,

ideological

liberal

organi za tions have exper ienced a s i qn i f ican t resurgance in
membership

totals

contributions

and

a

concomitant

increase

in

in response to emotionally-laden direct-

mail campaigns.

A)

To tes t th is hypothesi s, lin tend to es tabl ish whether or not

ideological riberal organizations did indeed prosper in terms of
membership growth and fund raising since 1980. And if so, to see if
this resurgance can be attributed to successful anti-Reagan/anti-New
Right grass roots SOlicitations. validating this hypothesis will
require

these

groups

to

conclusively

show:

first,

that

their

memberships and contributions have increased markedly; and second,
that this phenomenon directly stems from direct-mail appeals.

B)

The primary source of this data are the membership files and

contribution records of the respective organizations. If a resurgence
since 1980 is detected, I will consult with staff members responsible
for membership drives and fund raising to see if is linked to directmail campaigns.
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liThe degree of unity within a group is probably most
fundamental in determin ing the measure of success it
will enjoy through its political activity."~/
-HYPOTHESIS 11

Hoping

to

Reagan's

capitalize

on

conservative

public

fears

policies,

about

ideological

President
liberal

organizations are placing an increased emphasis on policy
formulation and dissemination to coalesce and mobilize
potential liberal activists, thereby eliminating the New
Right's heretofore monopoly on getting issues into the
political marketplace.

A)

The true test as

to whether or not

ideological liberal

organizations operate more effectively as pol i tical idea groups when
on the de fens i ve, is to see how and how

0

f ten they have fac i 1 i ta ted the

exchange of liberal views since 1980. Therefore, it is necessary to
assess

the

qual i ty

(formulation)

and quant i ty

sponsored,

and

the

of

the

forums

and

conferences

publ ications

and

newsletters

(dissemination) released by these groups since the Reagan/New Right
{andslide. If this hypothesis is to be verified, these groups must
show that they are, in fact, stimulating and coordinating liberal
thinking through the forementioned and possibly other means of pol icy
formulation and dissemination.

B)

The principal sources of this data will be interviews with

appropriate staff members, namely public relations personnel, and my
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own experiences as an ADA intern. During my six month tenure in
Washington,

I

intend

to

ascertain

how

ideological

liberal

organizations have promoted policy formulation and dissemination to
coalesce and mobilize potential liberal activists since 1980 •

..

33

"Lobbying may reinforce, activate, or convert
legislators; plainly the most important effect is
reinforcement ."77/ .•• "Lobbying strength reaches
its peak when anumber of organizations combine
forces. 1Il....§./
-HYPOTHESIS 111

Facing a common threat and sharing complimentary sets of
goals,

ideological

single-issue

liberal

groups

have

organizations
begun

to

and assorted

engage

in

ad-hoc

legislative alliances since the 1980 election. By pooling
their

resources

with

various

single-issue

groups,

ideological liberal organizations are seeking to enhance
their

lobbying

capacity

and

thus,

neutralize

the

New

Right's legislative initiatives.

A)

In

measuring

the

validity

of

this

hypothesis,

it

is

essential to initially establish: the approximate number of ad-hoc
coalitions ideological liberal organizations have joined since 1980;
which sing le- issue groups they choose to al ign wi th; and which issues
precipitated the formation of these loose alliances. This in turn will
shed light on the overall effectiveness of lobbying coalitions in
reinforcing organizational ties with legislators who share their
policy objectives.

B)

I wi 11 rely on the leg isla ti ve represen ta t i ves themselves to

provide the principal source of data necessary to validate this
hypothesis. Through personal interviews, I intend to establish the
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underlying reasons for their respective organization's cooperation
in each particular coalition, and ask them to assess the impact of
these joint ventures.
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"Studies have shown that attempts to 'pressure'
leg isla tor s are coun terproduct i ve. Mo r ao ve r , groups
with real grass roots support often have more
influence with legislators than do Washington-based
staff organizations."!..2.1
-HYPOTHESIS IV-

with access to a far broader-based and thus, potentially
more

influential

organ i z a t ions have

constituency,
set ou t

to

ideological

thwar t

the

liberal

New Righ t ' s

legislative initiatives by cultivating grass roots support
in two distinct ways: One, the direct approach -- "explicit
assistance or direction to group members or sympathizers to
can tac t represen ta t i ves or sena to r s abou t an issue or bill;
two,

the

indirect

approach

"p r omo t i nq

a

general

v iewpo in t on a broad pol icy issue by us i ng popular outlets
for

lobbying

appeal-ads

in

newspapers

and

magazines,

commercials on television and radio."!!.Q/

A)

The basic yardstick of this hypothesis is the capacity of

ideological liberal organizations to maintain a steady stream of
correspondence between the grass roots and lawmakers. Thus, it is
imperative to first establish the frequency in which these groups
prompt potential activists to contact their legislators. Next, it is
equally necessary to find at how often and through what channels
ideological liberal organizations attempt to shape a favorable public
opinion for their policy objectives among strategic elements of the
population.

Verifying

this

hypothesis

requires

these

groups

to
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plainly show that they are acting as a conduit between the grass roots
and political officials more often and
Further,

they must demonstrate

that

on more polemic

they

are

issues.

facilitating

this

exchange of communications through broad media appeals.

8)

The sources of this data will again be the lobbyists and

public relations personnel of these groups. They can provide me with
the data needed to establish how much emphasis their organizations are
placing on grass roots tapping.
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"As demoralized liberals awaken to a new decade,
they're discovering that Reagan I s election may have
been a blessing in disguise. To judge by the
increased budgets of liberal PAC'S.~/
-HYPOTHESIS V-

Inspired by the impact of the New Right and reacting to
conservative electoral successes in 1980,

liberals are

mounting a counterattack, manifest in the proliferation of
political

action committees.

These groups

are

turning

public disenchantment with the Reagan Administration's
policies

into

embattled

PAC

liberal

financially

contributions,

aimed

incumbents

giving

strapped

liberal

and

at
a

challengers

assisting
boost
in

to
the

forthcoming 1984 election.

In order to guage the validity of this hypothesis, it is

A)

essential to establish whether or not liberal PAC's have amassed the
sums of money needed to neutralized NCPAC and other conservative PAC 1 s
by relying on a flood of small donations. This in turn requires liberal
PAC's

to

demonstrate

that

their

contributions

have

increased

significantly since 1980. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon these
PAC's to show that these contributions are being funnelled directly
into the campaign budgets of beseiged liberal candidates. Findings to
the contrary will serve to repudiate this hypothesis.

B)

The PAC records of financial contributions will provide me
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with sufficient enough data to assess the prospects of an effective
counterattack by liberal PAC's in 1984. By consulting with personnel
responsible for targeting the money, I will learn how these PAC's
determine which candidates they will assist and how much they will
invest in their campaign tresuries.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN POLITY

If

the forementioned hypotheses are

in

fact,

verified,

the

Reagan/New Right victory of 1980 will prove to be a pyhric victory for
conservatives. The evidence compiled in this proposal overwhelming
suggests

that

the

election

outcome

compounded

by

the

current

Administration's policies have sown the seeds of a pandemic liberal
rena issance, one wh ich promi ses to neutr al i ze the New Right, at leas t
in the short-run. As John Herbers, a New York Times journalist sees
it:

II

I.n many gr ass roots conunun i ties across the na t ion,

citizens are restless. The decline of the nation's
industrial base, concern over unemployment, falling
incomes, farm foreclosures and bankruptcies have
stirred new rwnblings. A multitude of citizen action
groups on the left, which sprung u~ in the 70's to
secure specific but frequently narrow goals on the
state or local level, are now seeking to organize the
discontent nationally and reverse the drift toward
conservatism evident in President Reagan's election
in 1980."!~/
Heeding these rumblings of discontent, beleagured Democrats on
Capitol

Hill

are

stepping

out

of

the

shadows,

voicing

a

more

vociferous opposition to the Administration's proposals and moving
with unaccustomed authority to seize the

initiative on critical

issues. According to Washington Post columnist Helen Dewar:
"Into this power vacuu~ the Senate Democrats have
stepped wi th a u n i ty, commanded and a sense of
mission that has escaped them since Reagan swept into
office, bringing with him a Republican Senate
majority for the first time in a quarter century."~/
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Clearly, the short-term implication of the Reagan/New Right
landslide of 1980 is a nationwide resurgance of the liberal movement.
Yet the long-term implications are less certain and hinge on the
ability of this heterogeneous liberal constituency to maintain some
semblance of unity after 1984. Historically this has not been the
case. Without a clear threat to their vested interests, unity among
1 iberals ebbs markedly, and the rift between ideo log ical and single
issue groups widens. But if 1 iberals have Le a r ned anything at all from
the 1980 election, they have learned not to let their guard down.
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